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I. Introduction
'The publication of Black and Scholes's (1974) study came after nearly tu.0 decades of intense academic controversy over the effects of dividends on stock prices. Using the large Center for Research in Security Prices (CKSP) data base and employing new econometl-ic methods that avoided many of the difficulties that had hampered earlier testing efforts, Black and Scholes found no significant I-elation betlveen stock returns and dividend yield or-dividend payout. Their resu1.t~ thus lent support to neither of tlvo contending hypotheses about dividend effects-the conventional view that the market prefers to obtain the income from stock as dividends and the contrary vie~v, widely held among academics, that the market demands higher-retur-ns on dividend-paying shares to compensate for tax penalties on dividend income.
Although acadernic I-eseal-chel-s continued to speculate about lvhy so seemingly important a yield-related effect as the tax penalty on dividends should have left so small a trace in the data, further empir-ical I-esear-ch seerned unpromising, barring new sources of data (perhaps from foreign countries) 01-new and more polver-ful methods of data analysis. Within the last few years, studies claiming just such improvements in methodology or data have appeared (e.g., Long 1978; Litzenbel-gel-and Ramaslvamy 1979 , 1980  Rosenber-g and Marathe 1979; Stone and Bal-tter 1979; Banz 1980; Blurne 1980; GOI-don and Bradford 1980; Hess 1980 Hess , 1982 Morgan 1980n, 1980h) with some, but by no means all, reporting significant, yield-related tax effects.
LVe will not here review these many studies in detail. 0u1-purpose rather is to warn against accepting as tax effects the yield-related effects I-epol-ted in those studies using shor-t-run definitions of dividend yield-that is, in tests seeking to deduce the differential tax burden on dividends over long-term capital gains from differences in rates of r-eturn on shares that d o and shares that d o not pay a cash dividend during the r-eturn inter-val. Tests employing such shol-t-run definitions of dividend yield ar-e inappropriate for that purpose. Exdividend day returns that reflected the long-term tax differential ~vould irnply substantial profit opportunities in short-term trading around ex-dividend days, particular-ly for brokers and dealers in securities. T h e cum-ex pr-ice differentials that maintain market equilibr-ium and keep such profit opportunities fr-om arising obliterate the traces of the long-run tax differential that the tests ~vith short-run yield definitions seek to measure.
.llthough tests lvith shor-t-I-un measures of expected dividend yield cannot reliably calibrate the effects of differences in the tax treatment of' dividends and long-term capital gains, they can, and frequently do, turn up lvhat appear-to be significant yield-related differences in rates of return. Kesear-chers reporting such differences, ho~vevel-, must recognize that they have a problem, not a solution. T h e challenge is to account for them. For-the particular shol-t-run measures considered here, the yield-related effects found in some tests are traced to biases, one, of a fairly subtle kind, introduced by dividend announcement effects.
T h e plan of the paper is as follolvs. Section I1 descr-ibes o u r method of testing for yield-I-elated tax effects-essentially tests of an after-tax capital-asset pricing model (CAIPM) using the familial-Fama-MacBeth (1973) rnethod of tirne-series pooling of cr-oss-sectional coefficients (but applied to individual stocks I-ather-than portfolios). T h e problems of defining the dividend-yield variable are then briefly explored along with some discussion of the properties of estimates based on short-I-un measures of yield. Section I11 presents the estimates of yield-related tax effects for-several alter-native shol-t-I-un yield measures. T h e estimates, most of ~vhich seem to imply substantial tax effects, are sensitive to the choice of dividend variable, largely, lve argue, because the shor-t-run measur-es are distorted to different degrees by dividend information effects. Purging these measures of dividend yield of infol-mation effects gives estimates of yield-related tax effects that are both statistically and economically insignificant. T h e next two sections show that this failure to find significant tax effects \\-ith oul-purged yield rneasur-es cannot plausibly be attributed to the inadequacies in o u r controls for risk (Sec. IV) nor to o u r neglect of nonlinear clientele effects (Sec. V). Nor should this failure be regarded as surprising. \Ye sholv, in oul-concluding Section VI, lvhy tests relying on shor-t-run responses to dividend payrnents cannot be expected to PI-ovide reliable estimates of the effects of a tax penalty on dividends over long-term capital gains. Whether such a tax effect, if it exists, can be detected lvith yield rneasur-es reflecting long-run dividend policies rathel-than shol-t-run payrnents remains a n open questlon.
The Dividend Coefficient and the Dividend Variable
\Ye seek to estimate the dividend coefficient u:, in the I-egl-ession equation:
where R i , is the I-ate of return on share i dur-ing period t , Rn is the riskless I-ate of interest dur-ing period t , hit is the estimated beta orsystematic risk coefficient for stock i for period t , and (lit is an estimate of the dividend yield of stock i in period t. We estimate equation (1) by the now familiar-three-step, pooled cr-oss-section, and time-series approach of Farna and MacBeth (1973) and Farna (1976) . Fir-st, the risk coefficient, beta, is estimated from a market model regression of the form over-the 60 months pr-evious to the test month t. For-month t, the risk coefficient, Lit,and an estimate of the dividend yield for each company are then treated as independent \,ariables in a cross-sectional multiple I-egr-ession of the form:
This step is repeated month by month, with the estimated risk and di~idend-yield ~ar-iables updated each tirne. In the final step, the coefficient (I:, is estimated as the sarnple mean, (I:{, of the monthly cr-oss-section regression coefficients ti:,,.T h e standard el-ror-of the estimate is computed as u , , , , , / f l , wher-e u is the standard deviation of the time series of ri,,,, and t' is the number-of months in the sample.
Unlike Farna and MacBeth (1973) , Black and Scholes (1974), or Farna (1976) , we apply the three-step rnethod using individual company data instead of pol-tfolios or-gr-ouped data. We d o this to simplify cornparison of various dividend measures and not from any belief that tests with ungr-ouped data ar-e necessar-ily mor-e efficient than tests ~vith gr-ouped data.
Readers ar-e ~varned that the distr-ibutional assumptions justifying the three-step procedur-e are not always lvell appr-oximated. T h e coefficients ci , , , for-example, are not generally distributed independently and identically over-the sarnple period, and their distributions ar-e sometimes asymmetr-ic and fat-tailed. Nor-does the sequence of coefficients ci,,, which can be interpr-eted as the returns or1 a "zero beta" portfolio, allvays have a zero beta. LVhen the sequence of coefficients A,, varies systematically with the market, Black and Scholes (1974) have suggested a fourth step in tvhich the sequence of coefficients il,, is regressed on the market excess rate of return. At appropriate points in the discussion, we ~vill take this fourth step as \veil. In the first part of the analysis, holvever, 12.e stipulate the statistical assumptions, as the lawyers might put it, and concentrate on the dividend var-iable.
T h e dividend coefficient Z, , if positive and lvithin a reasonable range (positive but less than .6),is often interpr-eted as an implicit "tax bl-acket" or "tax differ-ential." This interpretation can be Justified I-igorously in a CAPM framework by assurning investors nlaxirnize expected after-tax returns subject to the standard constraints. Br-ennan (1970) formulated such an after-tax CAPM relating expected befhre-tax returns to I-isk, Pi, 2nd dividend yield of the following form:
where T , the coefficient of the dividend term, is a weighted-average marginal tax differential of dividends over capital gains.' T h e Brennan model (and 1, irnplies that the dividend coefficient has the same value for all shares.' This prediction was tested by Hess (1980) , who finds it not descriptive of the data. Despite this evidence of rnisspecification of af'te1.-tax models such as (4) and its variants, the conventional reference to Z3 as an irnplicit tax bracket o r a tax differential will be maintained, at least until Ive present alternative interpretations.
T h e appropriate measure of dividend yield in tests for-tax o r other yield effects is by no means clear. T h e underlying valuation rnodels call for ;t measure of the market's expectation of future dividend yield. But over \\.hat horizon is that expectation to be measur-ed! Is it a one-step-ahead forecast? O r is it a forecast of the aver-age dividend yield that might be r-ealized from holding the share over a considel-aIde pel-iod of time? And if the latter-, how long?
Rernemher-, also, that the tax differential bet~veen dividends and capitill gains is itself a f'unction of the expected length of the holding period. Does the market accrue the tax differential, adjusting returns Inore or less evenly over time? 01-is the adjustment for tax effects concent~.ated mainly at times when dividends ar-e paid and tax liabilities incurl-ed? If the former, a long-run measure of expected dividend yield is the appr-opr-iate dividend variable. Black and Scholes (1974) , for example, took as their yield measure the r-ealized dividend yield of po~.tfolios selected by ranking securities by the sum of dividends per share paid during the previous year-divided by the price per share at the end of the year. Their ranking variable is thus a way, albeit a simple one, to approximate the average annual dividend yield expected by someone ~v h o bought one of their portfolios at the start of the year and planned to hold it for a year 01-more.
Bl;ick and Scholes's failure to find significant yield-I-elated tax effects ~vith their long-I-un variable led researchers to try the short-term 'ippl-oach by focusing on returns in and around the actual exdividend dates. T h e appropriate expected yield for-the test equations is, then, not sorne long-run aver-age but only the dividend yield, if any, expected by the rnarket during the nest return interval.
If the return interval is a month, as here and in most of the cited studies of yield effect^,^ the expected dividend yield for about t~vo-thirds of the firms in the sample will be zero, because the vast bulk of dividend-paying firms follo\i a quarterly payment cycle. Each monthly slope coefficient a,, in the second-pass regression will cornbine t~v o sources of variation in monthly dividend yields. T h e first is the cross-sectional variation in dividend yields among those firms expected to go ex dividend during the month. If a tax effect exists, the conditional mean returns of the high-yield ex-dividend firms ~vill be higher than for the lower-yield firms. X scatter plot for these ex-dividend firms would then be upward sloping. T h e second source of variation in yields is that between the ex-dividend firms as a group and the non-ex firms. T h e returns of the non-ex firms ~vill lie along a vertical line through the origin (or-more precisely through the negative of the riskless rate since most tests are run ~vith the variables in premium form). T h e location of the mean return of the non-ex firms (about t~vo-thirds of the sample each month) ~vill thus have substantial Iveight in determining the intercept of each monthly regression (and hence, of course, also indirectly the slope coefficients a:,,). ' Including both groups I-ather than only those expected to go ex dividend increases the effective range of the critical yield variable and thereby presumably also the efficiency of the estimates of any yieldrelated tax effects. Ll'hether these hopes for greater efficiency can in fact be realized by the short-run approach, or ~vhether they are th~varted by other disadvantages, will be our principal concern in the sections to follo~v.
Estimates of Yield-related Tax Effects under Alternative Short-Run Definitions of Yield
Even if I\.e accept the logic of the short-run approach, the market's expectations of the cash dividends to be paid in month t must still be specified. .In obvious first approximation is the actual dividend payment in month t-that is, assume the actual dividend payment 'Some dividend \tudie\ use d,til! data, though in a test fill-mat sotnewh;it differerlt fro111 the three-or four-pass procedut-e usetl here (see, e.g.. Elton and GI-uber 1970; Black and Scholes 1973: Kalay 1977) . Orle (Blurne 1980) uses a cluartrrl\ t-eturri i n t e n d (and a long-run di\idrntl rneasut-e) precisely to \meat-o \ e r the curn-ex diffrrentials that rnotiiate the \hol-t-term yield approach.
' .I \tartel-plot of tnorlthlv excess returrl, .tgainst dividend jielda for a cornbined salnple of ex-divitlerltl and non-ex-tlividet~tl firlns is ,ho\\-n in fig. 1 . Rcadcrs at-r \\a~-ned, ho\\e\et-, that the ptctut-e is intended at this poirlt orllv to pol-tray the two source5 of variation: analvsis of' ttut scatter must he defet.red. equaled the expected dividend payment. Such an assumption will not be uni\-ersally true, of course, for dividend surpl-ises d o occur; but a m o n~h is a short forecasting interval aftel-all, and as Hess (1980) points out, the perfect-foresight estimate can at least be consitle~-ed one bound on the set of pel-missible approximations. Certainly if no dividend effect turned u p ~vith this approximation, there ~vould be little point in going further.
Thr Pp?fr(t-Forp\~ght D~j n~t l o n Dzuzdpnd Yzeld of 'I'he estimated tax effect coefficients obtained under this definition of dividend yield are sho~vn in the first rol\' of table 1. For the pel-iod 1940-78-~vhich, for reasons noted later, is the longest benchmark period over l\.hich the effects of the different dividend variables can be compared-the coefficient a:,turns out to be .317 with a t-ratio of no less than 10.2. Thus at first sight the case for the shol-t-run approach seems amply vindicated. T h e coefficients are not only in the plausible range for a tax effect but appear estimated ~vith great precision.
These appearances may be deceptive, however, because fol-ces at ~vor-k in the data impart a n upward bias to the dividend coefficient. Bet~veen 30 and 40 percent of the firms going ex dividend in month t
tli\.itlcnd \ieltl 1)ivitlelrtl \ieltl of 12 rnotlth\ ago ( n o 1-t.g;~rtl to ?\-(ti\ itlrnd t n o l~t h ) Positi\ c. l.K di\itiet~ti )ieltlu \rt to divitle~~tl \ielcls ot 3 6 tnotltlis ;igo 1.K tli\itlentl \it. 
< i~\~d c n d f r , ,~~ ('c.ntc,r f o r F'~IL~,\I(.KSPI ~t~u n t h l \ also declared during the same month t. Considel-t~v o such stocks and suppose that at the end of the PI-evious month the market's expected dividend Ivas $1.00 for each. O n the basis of this expectation, assume the price of each has been set at $50 per share. Suppose one firm increases its dividend to $1.50 a share and the other cuts its dividend to $0.50 a share. T h e first firm \\.ill now be I-ecol-ded as having a dividend yield of 3 percent and the second of only 1 percent. But the high-yield firm will also have a highel-realized rate of return for the month if, as is often the case, the market interprets the unexpected increase in dividends as signaling improved earnings PI-ospects for the company. By the same token, the company ~vith the disappointing cut in dividends may find its return for the month dragged d o~v n by a fall in the end-of-month price that reflects the market's do~vnward I-evision of the company's future earnings. Errors in dividend anticipations and realized rates of return ~vill thus tend to be positively con-elated. ' Out-e5tirnate is somewhat lolver thari that repot-tetl h\ Lirzenberger ant1 Ralna\\\a11i\ (19'79) . lvhose sample peritxl is 5olnelvhat different (1936-57 I-arher than 1040-78). \t'e start ft-o~n 1040 because the GRSP tape lists few cleclaration dates PI-ior to tti;it \eat.. Hence cort-ections cannot be made (either hv the LR method or others to he considered below) fol-most of the cases in which the declaration date and ex date are in Exploiting the declaration date in this fashion reduces the u p~v a r d bias in Nj but does not eliminate it. One group of firms still remains for ~vhich the 1,R variable is the actual dividend yield even though the firms have declared and paid in the same month. These are the firms that might have paid a dividend in month t on their regular quarterly schedule, but whose directors, at some time during the month, have votccl to omit dividends. T h e CRSP tape will report, correctly, no dividends paid during the month and no date on ~vhich a dividend Ivas declared. But absence of a dividend declaration during the month is information not available to the market at the beginning of' the month. And as the old story goes, there may be an important clue in knolving that a dog did not bark! -1.0 see h o~\ . overlooking this clue can bias regressions employing the LR dividend variable, consider again the two similar firms for ~vhich the market's expected divitlencl was $1.00 per share. Suppose that for each firm separately the market's consensus probability Ivas .5 that the firm ~vould declare a dividend of $2.00 and .5 that the firm would ornit the dividencl. Suppose further that the price of the shares post announcement will double if the dividend announced is $2 and will halve if the dividend is omitted. If the initial price for each firm Ivere, say, $10, the realized rate of return ~\.oulcl be 120 percent ~v h e n a $2.00 dividencl is announced and -50 percent hen the dividend is set to zero, ~\.hich implies an ex ante (and, of course, also average ex post) rate of return of 35 percent. T h e ex ante expected dividend \ ield for both shares is 10 percent. Regressions of realized returns on expected dividend yields for such ex ante matched pairs ~\.oulcl show no relation bet~veen the t~v o variables.
Suppose, however, that in those regressions the 1,R variable had been used instead of the market's expected dividend yield. And suppose, for concreteness, that the most recent regular dividend ~vithin the last l h m o n t h s had been $2.00 for each firm. A firm noI\. announcing a clividenci of $2.00 in month t would be recorded as having a dividend yield of 20 percent and a realized return of 120 percent. A firm passing its dividencl would have a realized return of -50 percent but a dividend yield of zero under the LK definition. Thus the regressions ~\.ith 'the LK variable would show hat appears to be a positive association between returns and dividend yields even though returns are actually independent of correctly measured ex ante clividend yields." the \ ; m e rnonth. Tests that Include the PI-e-1940 years \\.ill to that extent still be subject to the i~lfi)rrnatiorl-effect bias deicribed above.
"rhe 1,i;is introduced bv le1.o-dividend firms under the LR definition can persist for u p to three ,iddition,il ctuartel-> after the first regular di\-idend is passed. Those firms th,it I-esurne I-egulal-dividends one, t\vo, 01-three quarters later will have higher I-eturns
Inforrtrutzon E f f r c t~ or Tax Effects?
That valuable information may be contained merely in the knowledge that a dividend Ivas o r was not paid during a month is strongly suggested by some of the other tests reported in table 1. Note, for example, that when we use not the firm's actual dividend yield but its dividend yield 12 months ago, if any, no significant coefficient emerges. Yet the cross-sectional variation anlong the firnis is just as large and the yields show substantial stability over time. But when Ive use ~v h a t will presumably be an even more out-of-date predictor, namely, the dividend yield of 3 years ago, Ive get a highly significant positive coefficient, provided I\.e restrict the nonzero entries to those firms for ~\.hich the level-revised yield was nonzero in t. Even rnore striking is the fact that a significant coefficient is produced ~vithout reference to any specific dollar value for the dividends, but merely a dummy variable set equal to one if the I,R dividend variable Ivas nonzero.
Although these tests are suggestive, they cannot by themselves tell Ivhether the ex-dividend month shows u p because of information effects or tax effects. But there is a way to find out.
Yzeld V u~~u b l e~
Utzng Only Dzvzdends Declared zn Advance Table 2 presents estimates of Z3 for several different yield measures, in each of ~vhich the nonzero elements of the vector include dividends paid in month t, but only if declared in a month prior to t. For these firms, at least, un~\.anted information effects of the kind found in the previous definitions are absent. Yet the logic underlying the short-run approach is maintained because these firms did go ex dividend in month t.7
In the first panel of part A, the entry in the yield vector for any firm that both declared and paid its dividend in month t is set to zero. This approach seeks to offset the d o~v n~\ . a~-d pull on the intercept by the "dogs that did not bark" with the upward pull from those declaring and paying nonzero dividends during the same month. Announceand higher-LK dividend vields than those othet.wise coriipat.able firrna that disappointed the tnarket bv not resuming their regular tiiviciendi during the 12-month inter-\a1 following the cut.
' Table 2 pr-esents estimates both for the entire sample per-iod 1940-78 and tot. foursubper-iods. (;I-eat caution should be taken in rnterpretrng the subperiod results, lvhrch ;ire presented only to grve some idea of the substantial \-ariabrlitv in the divrdend coefficients over-time. T h e patterns of subperiod coefficients appear unr-elated to changes in the tax law or to the downward drift in the weighted-average rnarginal tax bracket (see n. 1 ) that would presuniablv have accompanied the steady-increase in the pr-opal-tion of stocks held bv tax-exempt institutions over the sample peritxl. rnent effects should net to zero if all announcements are included.
T h e disadvantage of the approach is that setting a nonzero dividend to zero creates an el-rors-in-va1,iables problenl that attenuates the estimate of ( 1 , . But the degree of attenuation from this source is known-the bias tolvard zero can be shown to be approxirnately the p~mpol-tion of firms whose yields are changed (about 40 percent over the sample period)-and can be taken into account before conclusions are drawn. .As can be seen from the table, however, interpretations are unlikely to be much affected by adjustrnents for attenuation. T h e dividend coefficient for the entire sample period 1940-78 is close to zero ( -.O268) and statistically insignificant.
T h e tests in the second panel differ frorn those just mentioned by eliminating firrns both declaring and paying dividends in month t rather than shifting then1 to the zero dividend group. T h e attenuation bias of ( l a ) is thereby reduced in ( l b ) , but at the cost of rernoving the offset to the net negative information effects in the zero dividend group. As expected, the estirnated Z3for the overall period, .0368, is indeed higher than in the first panel, but still far too small to be considered a significant tax effect.
T h e third panel of table 2 goes a step furthe1 and drops frorn the sample all firms except those that both paid dividends in t and announced thern in advance. This definition avoids the biases in the first two sets of tests but sacrifices any contribution to the precision of estimating the tax effect that might come from including both exdividend and non-ex-dividend shares in the same sample.
.Iglance at this third panel shows that when the known biases are removed in this fashion, no relation remains between excess returns and dividend yields for the ex-dividend firms. T h e point estimate of the coefficient U3 falls to a n economically negligible and statistically insignificant value of .0135. Thus if yield-related effects d o exist, they clearly cannot be attributed to differences in the dividend yields of the firms actually paying dividends in the month. 
a ) . T h e last column of ])art B is an adjustment (see the discussion in Black and
Scholes 119741) to allow for the correlation between the monthly dividend coefficients and the market return coefficients, (I,,. This coi-rection furthe1 reduces the size and significance of the dividend coefficient.
Summing u p to this point, we find the relation between returns and dividend yields to be sensitive to the definition of dividend yield. T h e 'LVe helieve that the dumrn) variable approach using all the data is a safer and mol-c ~-eliat)le lvav of utiliring the non-ex firms that1 tl-ying to remove information effects from that group I,\ thl-o\\.ing some away. T h e dange1-is that the non-ex firnms retained tna! be a n unrepresentatiw sarnple of ~ero-dividend firms and ma! bias the regression (oefht ient. .isan example of how biases m,iy inadve1-tently creep in J\-hen some but riot , 111 zel-o-dividend firms :ire retained, consider the seemingly harmless step (proposed in 1.ivenl)erger and Rarnaswarny (1981, p. 91) of including as zero in the expected yield vector fo1-rnorlth t onl! those firms that went ex in month t -1 and for which, therefore, the 1na1-ket could reasonably presume n o dividend would be paid in t. T h e tl-ouhle is, holvever, that those firms currently or permanently following a no-dividend policy \vould be excluded from the ze1-o-dividend group. These excluded no-dividend firrns tend to be \ni;~ll firms; arid given the so-called small-firm effect (see Banr 1981; K e i~i~~n u m 1981) they Lvill also tend to have above-average excess returns. T h e 7ero-dividend firms going ex in t -1 and not excluded will thus tend to have lower than average excess I-eturns and will thereby impart an upward twist, presumably unrelated to dividend tax effects, to the regression coefficient.
I n this test, the coefficients ci, and u2 are coristrairied to be the same for all firms, ~vhich is ce1-tainly reasonable it1 this context. $Ye have also rut1 the tests with separate slope and inte1-cept durnrnies to free those coefficients as well. 'I'he results fol-the dividend coefficienta are essentiall\ the same. differences in estimated yield effects appear to reflect differences in the degree to which the various short-run measures of expected dividend yield introduce unrvanted information effects. After correcting those measures for their information effects 12.e find no significant remaining relation between returns and expected dividend yields-certainly nothing that could be considered a yield-related tax effect of the classic kind. Before we seek to explain this finding, prudence suggests a check for other deficiencies in the testing procedure that may be obscuring a tax effect.
IV. Possible Biases from Inadequate Risk Corrections
T h e tests of table 2 have been designed to remove information effects, but other biases affecting the dividend coefficient may still remain.1° Dividend yields, for example, may be proxying for risk. If dividend yields tend to be lo~z.er for high-risk f i~m s , as seems likely, and if risk is measured 12,ith error, as seems even more likely, the dividend coefficient in a cross-sectional, multiple regression of the kind in tables 1 and 2 will be given a negative twist (at least over those sample periods in which the market return is positive).
.A tu.ist of the opposite kind occurs, horvever, to the extent that firms adjust their dividends slo~z.ly to changes in their earnings prospects. In the months follorving the announcement of good nelvs, a firm's price pel. share will tend to be higher and its "true" beta tend to be lower (because of leverage and option effects, if nothing else) than in the months before the announcement. If, at the same time, the firm maintains its dividend 01.increases it only gradually, its dividend yield 12,ill be smaller than before. For these good nervs firms, low dividend yields will appeal to be associated rvith abno~.rnally low returns in the months after the announcement because the measured beta, based mainly on preannouncernent months, rvill be too high; rvhile for firms maintaining their dividends in the face of bad news, high dividend yields will be associated lvith high abnormal returns."
Correcting for biases of these kinds is more difficult than for the information effects of the previous section. Since these biases arise, in part, out of nonstationarities and misspecifications in the underlying I' klan) of'the i\sues cotl\idered in thi\ section are tl-eated in KI-eater detail in Hess ( 1980) . " Bias due to C~I-relation in beta cannot of dividend )ields with 1neaiur.eInerlt e~-I-01-s he el~rninated rnerel) by taking palns to assr11-e that the measures of expected dividenti vielcia in the te\t\ use only pa\t data. I n fact, extr:~polative measure\ of expected dividends (of the hind proposed, say, in hlorgan [1980n, 198061 or. Litzenhe~-ger. and Kam,is\~,~my [1981. pp. 7-81) a~-e likely to itlcreaie the bias. Extrapolative measu1-e\, t)y their.
nature, ill give the appearance of "dividenci 5tat)ilizationVof' the kind ciescriheci even whet1 the firm has actually adapted its dividend to the change in its circu~~~starlces.
pl-ocesses describing returns, Tve cannot rely on ordinary errors-invariables approaches (such as those proposed, e.g., in 1,itzenbel-ger and Rarnas\\arny [1979] ). But Tve can at least check the sensitivity of the dividend coefficient Z:, to variations in the risk measures.
Part .A of table 3 sholvs the effects of a risk measure even worse than the st;lndard, first-pass 5-year bitused in tables 1 and 2, to wit, none at all. (For simplicity, the I-esults are presented only for the dummy variable test corresponding to part B of table 2, since that test is the most efficient.) Note that for the overall sample period, the value of the dividend coefficient is little changed. Finding a better risk proxy is not as simple as finding a Tvorse one. But the search for risk proxies need not be restricted to singlevariable measures such as bi,. T h e discussion of the biases above suggests that the current end-of-previous-month price pi,,-, may :iddirlg that variable-actually its reciprocal l/pi,t-l-to make its scaling comparable to that of the dividend-yield variable. Note that it does indeed contribute significantly (more so, in fact, than hi, itself). But the key dividend coefficient remains as small and insignificant as before."
V. The Results for Subgroups
Significant tax effects i11 the aggregate sample may perhaps have been obscured by nonlinear clientele effects of the kind discussed in Litzenberger and Karnas~varny (1980) .As a check ive present tests similar to theirs in ~vhich (I, is estimated separately under various short-run " 1 he vat-iahle lip,,,. , can alao provide a stt-iking illustration of o u r warning (aee nn.
8, 1 1 ) that short-run measurea of expected dividend yield, even \vhen put-ged ot alitlouliCelilerlt effecta, 111;1\ still lead to biased estimates of yield-rclated tax effecta. That \ai-iahle, aftet-all, can be conaidered a measure of expected dividend yield in rxhich the fot-ecasted dividend of every firm next period is taken to be $1. Such a fot-ecast is crude but is at leajt based entirely on past infot-mation and hence is ft-ee from ,innouncement ef.fects ot the kind considered earlier. For all its crudeneaa as a forecast, however, l/p,.,-, haa a positive and significant coefficient \\.hen uaed aa the meaaut-e of expected dividend yield in tests for tax effecta. Since the numerator is a constant, the \ignihcant positi\e ~a l u e of the coefficient can come only from the information about the fit-m's future prospects, additional to that in bi,, conveyed by the current pt-ice in the denonlinator. All) other measure of dividend kield with pi,-, in the denominatot-, auch
;is those in Litzenberger and Ratndswamy (1981) or in Auet-hach (1981, esp. pp. 16-18) , lvill, ot cout-se, be subject to the same ~1p~var.d bias.
definitions of dividend yield for subgroups of firms ranked by past average dividend yield. In the tests shown in table 4, the ranking is bv the Black-Scholes yield-r anking variable (previous year dividends divided by end-of-year price) updated ~nonthly. Group I contains the 20 percent of firms ranked loivest by this measure, group 11 the next 20 percent, and so o n to group V, the highest. T h e estilr~ates ofz, for the subgroups in table 4 appear to be no less sensitive to the defi~lition of dividend yield than the overall satnple estiliiates considered earlier. But note that for these tests, correcting for information bias (last column) by the method in A(1a) of table 2 now does not reduce all the dividend coefficients t o insignificance. T h e coefficient for the loivest yield group remains positive and significant even when the nonzero components of the yield variable include only dividends declared in advance.
.A closer look at the underlying data, however, raises doubts about the reliability of the estimate for the loiv-yield group. T h e cumulants, fractiles, and other relevant sample statistics of the 468 monthly cross-sectional regression coefficients G,, for the lo~vest dividend-yield group are given in table 3. Note that the observations cluster very tightly around the modal value of zero. A number of extreme outliers are present, hoivever, at both ends of the scale. T h e highest estimated "tax bracket" is the "1,333" percent reached in October 1968, and the lowest is the " -1,041" percent in January 197 1. Not only are the positive outliers larger, but they are more numerous. T h e right ske~v-ness in the distribut.ion is apparent in the fractiles reported in table 3. S o t e in particular hoiv far the median is below the mean-,098 as co111p;ired ivith ,373.
Ample justification exists for throwing out these extrerne observations in computing an average tax effect for the period as a ~vhole. But the case becomes more compelling given the underlying observations o n yields and returns that produced the extrerne coefficients. Figure 1 , for example, sho~vs the scatter plot of the relation bet~veen returns and yields for the lo~vest yield group in the month April 1967-another month ~vith estimated ri,, > 15. Table 6 shoivs the nunlerical values for the first 40 observations ranked by size of dividend yield. Note first that only 16 of the 178 firms in the group had nonzero dividend yields-zero yield being entered not at zero but at -,0042 after subtracting the estimated riskless rate of interest. T h u s in the scatter plot of figure 1, 91 percent of the observations lie along the vertical straight line through the -.0042 point on the dividend-yield axis. Of the 16 firrns ivith nonzero dividends, t~v o happened to have extremely large increases in price during the month-one ivith a return of over 60 percent and one ~vith a return of 22.8 percent. These two points alone account for the sign, size, and apparent Dividend Yield (minus riskless rate) 1;1(,. 1 -E.xtrs\ returns o11 di\itiend \iel(i fot-lowest divitientl-\iel<i group i l l Apt-il 1967. tui-11 out to be largely responsible for the seemingly significant value of';:, for the lo\\.est yield group. T h e sensitivity o f t h e sample mean to the extreme values ofri,, is shotvn in table 7. When rve chop off the 33 cases or-7 percent t\,ith cross-sectio~~al regression coefficients greater than 3 in absolute value, the sarnple mean falls from ,373 tvith a t-value of 2.8 to ,098 ~\.ith a t-value of only 1.O. If \\.e chop a further 32 rvhose coefficients fall outside a range of plus o r tninus 4, the estimated implicit tax bracket falls to ,036 ~vith a t-value of 0.44.
In principle, we might go on to examine the observations in the other four subgroups. But \\.hy bother?':' Subgroup tests of the kind in table 4 and some other recent studies are too inefficient and u~lreliable, even apart from their vul~~erability to outliers, to throw l 3 .\ctudlly, of C O L I~S C . we did examine the other groups and filund, as might be expected, that the outlier prol,lem was less severe because nlol-e dividend entries were nonLero in tho5e higher-yield groups in the typical month. T h e coefficients, however, \$.ere still jensitive to trimming.
Ketur-n Dilidend Yield Milill\ Ri\kless R ,~t e an)-light on the issues in dispute. T h e ~vithin-group estimates of tax brackets reflect only ~v h a t little variation in short-run dividend yields remains after the substantial bet~veen-group variation in average yields has beer1 removed. I n fact, if the preclassificatio11 ~v e r e cotnpletely successful, the within-group variation ~vould be mostly noise!'4 '"rile \uhstantial negative coefficient that emerges for the highest yield portfolio in .An insti-unlent so unreliable permits n o firm conclusiorls about the existence o r absence of tax clienteles. But we can say, at least, that the subgroup tests presented provide n o grounds for suspecting that important, yield-related tax effects in o u r aggregate sar-nple are obscured by fitting a straight line to a nonlinear relation.'"
VI. Why Tax Effects Should Not Be Expected in Tests Using
Short-Run Measures of Expected Dividend Yield \Ye recognize, as did Black a n d Scholes (1974) , that o u r f a1 '1ui-e to detect yield-related tax effects leaves something of a puzzle. Why does : i tax effect that seems so plausible to so many on a pi-iori grounds appear to leave no detectable track in the data? I n the case of the short-run dividend r-neasures, at least, Tve believe the puzzle 111ay have it relatively simple solution. Recall that the presumed tax effect ~vith that yield variable is essentially the average difference in rates of retui-11on those shares that go ex dividend in a given month and those that d o not. Some or-all of this differelice is supposedly the equalizing differential necessary to r-nake those o~vning the shares at the start of the month indifferelit bet\\-een c o n t i~i u i~i g to hold the shares (and paying full tax 011 the forthcoming dividend) atid selling the shares corporate il~vestors might conceivabl\ be responsible. But a mot-e likel) candidate is the pl-o\\-bi,t\ discussed earlier. Fol-tunately, no great urgency attaches to resolling the 1 1 u~~l e .
.I, \ \ e show in the next section, tests of the kind in tiible 4 could not shed any I-cli,~hle light on tax-related clienteles even if their econometric deficiencies Lvere rep,~ir.cd.
'".I highl\ tionlineal., in fhct U-shaped, I-elation between I-eturns and yields is repol-tcd 11) Hlunle (1980) .although in tests using a long-run rneasure of dividend yield r-;ttllel th.111 t l~e sllol~t-l.un ~neaiures considered here. Later work by Keirn (1982), ho\\c\el-, \uggests that Klurne's yield effects are confounded \\.ith the so-called small-firm effect. After one controls for sire of firm, the nonlinear yield effects largely v<~nisl>.
curn dividend (and payi~ig tax 011 the ir-nplicit divide~id at the lo~ig-term capital gains tax rate). As Elton and Gruber- (1970) have s h o~v n , if the capital gains tax rate is less than the rate on dividends, the price fall from the last cum-dividend day to the first ex-dividend day \.rill be less than the dividend paid. T h e (risk-acl-lusted) rate of return on the ex-divide~id day (and, by extension, on the months co~ltaining the ex-dividend davs) ~vill thus be higher-than on no11-ex days a~i d ~n o~l t h s .
This plausible a~i d oft-i~ivoked expla~iatio~i fhtal has, ho~vever, a flaiv. If the price falloff on the ex-dividend day \Yere really less than the dividend (after correcti~ig for risk), then shor-t-term traders, buying cum-divide~id shares and selling them ex dividend, \vould earn above-1lorrna1 profits. Remember that for such in-and-out traders (and also for tax-exennpt institutions) the tax rate on dividends a n d 011 capital gains-in this tr-ansactio~i actually capital losses-is precisely the sa~ne.'" Short-terrn traders can be expected to dor-ni~iate the short-ter-111 equilibrium a n d hence to eliminate the presumed cor-npensati~lg curn-ex differe~itial. In principle, every i~ivestor, taxable o r not, can exploit that profit opportunity from short-term trading, ~vher-eas the potential sellers are only those taxable investor-s ~v h o happen to o\vn the shares (and are ~i o t locked i11 by holding period I-estr-ictio~is o r by potential taxes on past unrealized gains). Some individual taxpayers terripted to exploit the profit opportunities in shor-t-term cum-ex tr-ading may find therriselves constr-ained by the capital loss limitations and the rvash-sale rules. But these provisio~ls d o not apply to brokers or dealers in securities. For such brokers a n d dealers organized as corporations, moreover-, a n d for cor-porate traders generally (including casualty insur-a~ice companies) the profit pote~itial in short-ter-~n curn-ex trading is further enlarged by the exclusio~i of 85 per-cent of divide~ids received from any taxable U.S. corpor-atio~i fro111 taxable cor-porate profits.
TI-ansactions costs rei~lforce the dominance of short-terrri buyers in setti~lg the equilibrium cum-ex differential. T h e round-tr-ip costs faced by pote~itial sellers among the taxable i~ivestors a r e substantially larger than those i~i c u r r e d by the brokers a n d dealers s t a~i d i~i g ready to capitalize o11 deviations fro111 the short-run tr-ading ecjuilibriurn.
T h e presence of tr-ansactio~is costs, even the comparatively small inside ~n a r k e t costs of the 111-okers a n d dealers, may \cell keep the ex-divide~id pr-ice from al~vays falling by the full amount of the divi-' " 1 nurnber of notably Kala) (1977), have pointed out this flaw in the i\.~-ite~.s. Eltot1-(;1 uhel-I-casoning. In fhct the point appears already to have reaclled the textbook Ic\cl-i\.itnes\ thc discussion in Copeland and LVeston (1979, p. 353). denct. .And since transactio~is costs are roughly propor-tiorla1 to price. the obser-ved price falloff may well be smaller relative to the dividend yield for lolv-than for-high-yield shares, exactly as the tax-clientele model seems t o predict. But such yield-related effects are 11ot tax effects, or at least not tax effects reflecti~ig the presurried tax penaltv on dividends over lo~lg-term capital gains that the shooti~ig is all about.I7
Solving the puzzle for-the shor-t-run measures of dividend yield still leaves unanslvered why yield-related tax effects have ~i o t been convinci~igly delrro~istrated i11 tests using long-run measures, like those of Black and Scholes (1974) . Per-haps the explanatio~i is that yieldrelated tax effects d o not accrue ~tlonth by r r~o~l t h as assumed implicitly i n many standard after--tax rnodels of asset pr-icing. They car1 sho~v u p i11 pri~lciple o1i1y i11 ex r-nonths, and there they are elir-ninated short-r-un tax trading. Or-perhaps month-by-1~011th accruals of tax-related differences i11 retur-11s could arise but are eli~ninated by supply ac!justnients as described i11 Black and Scholes (1974) or bv tax shelteri~lg as i11 hliller and Scholes (1978) . C)r perhaps the tax effect does accr-ue rno~ith by rrio~ith, but the data ar-e so 11oisy that the tax effect has escaped detectio~i by existing instr-ur-nents. 6t'hich of these explanations is cor-r-ect remains to be seen. But lve hope that the search can pr-oceed rrior-e effectively 11orv that \\-e krlolv at least \\-here not to look.
